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 Evolving Reality: The Strategic Shift in Crypto-Drug Market 
Enforcement 
Martin Horton-Eddison, Global Drug Policy Observatory 
m.horton-eddison@swansea.ac.uk 
Introduction 
Crypto-Drug Markets (CDMs), also referred to as Dark Net Drug Markets are anonymised 
internet sites which facilitate the sale and purchase of narcotic substances both 
domestically and internationally.   
This statement offers a strategic assessment of the evolving CDM Law Enforcement 
landscape, and some thoughts on the future direction of CDMs and CDM enforcement.   
‘Historic’ Strategic Approach 
In the recent past, the standard law enforcement strategy has been one of site takedown, 
aimed at arresting CDM administrators, and eliminating site servers with the sole purpose 
of taking the CDM offline. On the face of it, the site takedown strategy, as applied to the 
original Silk Road and its immediate successors, seemed a logical response – forcing sites 
simply to cease to exist.   
Although CDMs represent a novel threat, takedown may be usefully described as 
conventional: utilising existing law enforcement force-structures, general agents and 
agencies, and often unilateral approaches in order to attack the CDMs’ Centre of Gravity; 
to takedown the hub on which everything depends. 
The Failure of Takedown Strategy 
However, despite numerous high-profile historic takedowns, CDMs continue to exist – with 
new sites emerging or increasing their capacity to facilitate the online trade just as 
quickly as their predecessors can be taken down. To illustrate the point: the value of CDM 
drug transactions rose by 50% in the two years following the takedown of Silk Road in 
2013. As can be seen by the slide, even by the UNODC’s own assessment therefore, 
takedown simply doesn’t appear to work.  
Essential Trust 
The survivability and continued proliferation of Crypto-Drug Markets  appears to depend 
on assurance of several key trust areas: trust in the market , trust between vendors/
buyers, trust in the payment systems and currency, trust in the assurance of anonymity , 
and trust in delivery services. The evidence indicates that takedown may provoke the 
adoption of new technologies, increase public awareness – and therefore usage - of CDMs, 
and does little to undermine trust in many of the specific areas mentioned. 
Evolution 
Since 2017, domestic and international law enforcement appear to be adapting their 
approach, moving toward enforcement strategies which prioritise less conventional means. 
Law enforcement operations in 2017 and 2018 have displayed a more nuanced and 
sophisticated approach. Although operations are still managed by conventional law 
enforcement agencies, the strategic onus appears to be shifting toward the deployment of 
multiple specialist enforcement agencies, specialised agents, and complex joint 
international operations between multiple state partners. For example, the 2017 
multilateral takedown of AlphaBay occurred only after law enforcement had taken control 
of Hansa Market as a honeypot – a tactical step ahead of the markets’ users.  
This evolved strategy more closely targets our earlier essential elements of trust in - and 
function of - CDMs:  
Trust in the market – may be undermined if it is possible that the market is being 
operated by law enforcement 
Trust between Vendors/Buyers – may be undermined if it is possible that either is a law 
enforcement agent 
Trust in the payment systems and currency – may be undermined if currency exchanges 
might be being operated by law enforcement 
Trust in Anonymity – may be undermined if law enforcement can infiltrate the site to 
access communications between buyer and vendor 
Trust in delivery –  may be undermined if postal services are working closely with law 
enforcement to intercept deliveries 
Many of these elements are addressed by the evolving law enforcement strategy.  The 
deployment of the United States Postal Inspection Service (USPIS) to intercept packages, 
the Netherlands’ National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) to actually operate live CDMs, US 
agents posing as money launderers for Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies, and private 
companies such as Bitdefender providing unprecedented access to servers. Each provide 
clear examples of the strategic shift away from conventional takedown and toward an 
evolved approach.  Strategically speaking, we might usefully characterise the increased 
involvement of ancillary agencies and the deployment of smaller specialised and more 
nimble teams with specialised roles as something akin to a form of counter insurgency 
operation – using small force units with specialist skills, embedded in the ‘local 
population’, and sanctioned by sophisticated international alliances.   
A consequence of the evolved approach is that many of those points of trust as discussed 
earlier are more effectively undermined when compared to conventional takedown. 
Concluding Remarks 
In response to law enforcement operations and other factors, CDMs are technologically 
adaptive.  Tomorrow’s CDMs appear likely to be both decentralised – i.e having no central 
administration – and geographically distributed – with no central servers. These 
developments will render takedown completely obsolete.  Law enforcement strategy will 
have to continue to innovate in order to keep pace with these developments, becoming 
increasingly more specialised, time consuming, and expensive – in turn.  There may 
therefore be a need to balance the increasing expenditure against likely harm – for 
example considering market management approaches over purely punitive enforcement – 
as we are increasingly seeing in offline policy shifts around the world.  Efforts such as 
targeting only the most pernicious of vendors - rather than whole Crypto Drug Market 
sphere - may be one efficient strategy, allowing policy makers to more effectively balance 
the need to influence serious negative behaviour, with a nuanced awareness of the 
potential for CDMs to reduce both personal and social harm. 
